by Ken Timmerman at NewsMax
Israel will be compelled to attack Iran’s nuclear weapons facilities by this November unless the U.S. and its allies enact “crippling sanctions that will undermine the regime in Tehran,” former deputy defense minister Brig. Gen. Ephraim Sneh said on Wednesday in Tel Aviv.
The sanctions currently being discussed with Russia, China, and other major powers at the United Nations are likely to be a slightly-enhanced version of the U.N. sanctions already in place, which have had no impact on the Iranian regime.
And despite unanimous passage of the Iran Petroleum Sanctions Act in January, the Obama administration continues to resist efforts by Congress to impose mandatory sanctions on companies selling refined petroleum products to Iran.
In an Op-Ed in the Israeli left-wing daily, Haaretz, Sneh argues that Iran will probably have “a nuclear bomb or two” by 2011.
“An Israeli military campaign against Iran’s nuclear installations is likely to cripple that country’s nuclear project for a number of years. The retaliation against Israel would be painful, but bearable.”
Sneh believes that the “acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran during Obama’s term would do him a great deal of political damage,” but that the damage to Obama resulting from an Israeli strike on Iran “would be devastating.”
Nevertheless, he writes, “for practical reasons, in the absence of genuine sanctions, Israel will not be able to wait until the end of next winter, which means it would have to act around the congressional elections in November, thereby sealing Obama’s fate as president.”
Sneh does not foresee any U.S. military strikes on Iran, an analysis that is shared by most observers in Washington, who see the Obama administration moving toward containment as opposed to confrontation with Iran.
In a recent report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), military analyst Anthony Cordesman concluded that Israel will have to use low-yield earth-penetrating nuclear weapons if it wants to take out deeply-buried nuclear sites in Iran.
“Israel is reported to possess a 200 kilogram nuclear warhead containing 6 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium that could be mounted on the sea launched cruise missiles and producing a Yield of 20 kilo tons,” Cordesman writes in the CSIS study he co-authored by Abdullah Toukan.
Israel would be most likely to launch these missiles from its Dolphin-class submarines, he added.
While Sneh is no longer in the Israeli government, his revelation of a drop-dead date for an Israeli military strike on Iran must be taken seriously, Israel-watchers in the U.S. tell Newsmax.
“Ephraim Sneh is a serious guy,” said Malcolm Hoenlein, executive vice chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. “He was deputy minister of defense and has long been focused on the issue of Iran.”
Shoshana Bryen, Senior Director for Security Policy at the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), said that what struck her most about Sneh’s comments was the shift of emphasis from resolving the Palestinian problem to Iran.
“For 30 years, he’s been saying that solving the Palestinian problem is Israel’s biggest priority. Now he’s saying, forget about the Palestinians. Iran is the problem.”
Sneh “is extremely well regarded on the left and the right,” she added. “People respect him enormously.”
In his Op-Ed, Sneh argues that the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu needs to mend its bridges with the United States, and the only way to do so is by enacting an immediate and total ban on any settlement activity, including in Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.
“Without international legitimacy, and with its friend mad at it, Israel would find it very difficult to act on its own” against Iran, he argued.
See the original article at NewsMax
See this and more stories at Israel Behind the News
Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts
Saturday, April 3, 2010
Friday, March 5, 2010
The Philadelphia Bulletin: Differences Emerging between Israel and US over Iran
by David Bedein
JERUSALEM - The intelligence communities of Israel and the United States differ over Iran’s progress toward nuclear weapons.
“I think that beyond that there is, of course, a certain difference in perspective and difference in judgment, difference in the internal clocks and difference in capabilities,” Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak said.
In a Feb. 26 address to the Washington Institute, Mr. Barak acknowledged that Israel and the United States might not bridge their differences over Iran’s capabilities. He said the U.S. objections to Israel’s assessment should not block any campaign against Tehran’s nuclear program.
“And I don’t think that there is a need to coordinate in this regard,” Mr. Barak said. “That should be understood. It should be an exchange of views. We do not need to coordinate every step.”
The statement marked a rare occasion that Mr. Barak, regarded as the most U.S.-oriented member of the Israeli Cabinet, played down the need to coordinate with the administration of President Barack Obama. Mr. Barak, however, stressed that Israel supported Mr. Obama’s policy to employ diplomacy rather than military means against Iran.
“We clearly support the attempt to solve it through diplomacy,” Mr. Barak said.
The Israeli government has been pressing the U.S.administration for a timetable for harsh U.S. sanctions on Tehran, beginning with a gasoline embargo that would spark critical fuel shortages in Iran.
Instead, Washington has moved cautiously in efforts to draft sanctions against Iran. The State Department has ruled out significant measures against Iran’s energy sector.
For his part, Mr. Barak did not rule out the prospect that Iran could develop what he termed “second or second-and-a-half generation of nuclear warheads.” He said these warheads could be installed on ballistic missiles that could reach Moscow or Paris.
“If Iran will not be stopped from moving there, it will reach a certain point of nuclear military capability, and one can close his eyes and see what it means,” Mr. Barak said. “What is really needed is significant sanctions, effective ones with a time limit, together with the Russians and the Chinese.”
See this story in the Philadelphia Bulletin
See this report at Israel Behind the News
JERUSALEM - The intelligence communities of Israel and the United States differ over Iran’s progress toward nuclear weapons.
“I think that beyond that there is, of course, a certain difference in perspective and difference in judgment, difference in the internal clocks and difference in capabilities,” Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak said.
In a Feb. 26 address to the Washington Institute, Mr. Barak acknowledged that Israel and the United States might not bridge their differences over Iran’s capabilities. He said the U.S. objections to Israel’s assessment should not block any campaign against Tehran’s nuclear program.
“And I don’t think that there is a need to coordinate in this regard,” Mr. Barak said. “That should be understood. It should be an exchange of views. We do not need to coordinate every step.”
The statement marked a rare occasion that Mr. Barak, regarded as the most U.S.-oriented member of the Israeli Cabinet, played down the need to coordinate with the administration of President Barack Obama. Mr. Barak, however, stressed that Israel supported Mr. Obama’s policy to employ diplomacy rather than military means against Iran.
“We clearly support the attempt to solve it through diplomacy,” Mr. Barak said.
The Israeli government has been pressing the U.S.administration for a timetable for harsh U.S. sanctions on Tehran, beginning with a gasoline embargo that would spark critical fuel shortages in Iran.
Instead, Washington has moved cautiously in efforts to draft sanctions against Iran. The State Department has ruled out significant measures against Iran’s energy sector.
For his part, Mr. Barak did not rule out the prospect that Iran could develop what he termed “second or second-and-a-half generation of nuclear warheads.” He said these warheads could be installed on ballistic missiles that could reach Moscow or Paris.
“If Iran will not be stopped from moving there, it will reach a certain point of nuclear military capability, and one can close his eyes and see what it means,” Mr. Barak said. “What is really needed is significant sanctions, effective ones with a time limit, together with the Russians and the Chinese.”
See this story in the Philadelphia Bulletin
See this report at Israel Behind the News
Tuesday, January 26, 2010
Iran: The Time Has Come (INSS Insight No. 158, January 25, 2010)
If its domestic situation were not so serious, Iran's government could be
very happy indeed. Iran managed to gain another crucial year in its quest
for a nuclear weapons capability, and every passing day brings it closer to
its ultimate goal: having the potential to produce deliverable nuclear
weapons in short order, if it so decides. It successfully delayed the West
from pursuing a more severe sanctions regime, and the West is behaving as if
it has all the time in the world. It does not.
How did this come about? Several factors combined to achieve the net result,
most of them not of Iran's doing: the election of a new US president who
believed in engagement as the sole way to resolve conflicts (and may still
want to believe this); the unwillingness, for years, of the IAEA to
acknowledge Iran's ultimate goal; the (unclassified) 2007 US National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that raised the possibility that Iran abandoned
its quest for nuclear weapons; the reluctance of the US to assume the lead
role in confronting Iran, and letting the EU-3 deal, albeit ineffectively,
with the situation; the contrary attitude of Russia and China, which are
watching the West struggle to find a solution while throwing it a bone from
time to time in supporting some sanctions resolutions that are not achieving
their aim; and the exceptional spanner in the works embedded in the quite
unproductive suggestion to transfer some of Iran's low enriched uranium
(LEU) outside the country and return it as medium enriched uranium fuel for
its Tehran Research Reactor. This last statement needs some explanation.
On October 1, 2009, the P5 +1 (the five permanent Security Council members
plus Germany) and Iran began talks in Geneva that were supposed to deal with
a host of issues, including the suspension of Iran's uranium enrichment
activities. Meantime, the US proposed the said uranium transfer idea. The
rationale was, apparently, to remove the major portion of the LEU from Iran,
thus delaying Iran's potential to produce the core of its first nuclear
explosive device. The talks were then postponed for more than a month, the
IAEA produced a text of an agreement accepted by the Russian, US, and
Iranian delegations, and the Iranians went home to obtain the approval of
the agreement by their government. The government probably never had any
intention of approving this. The deadline for an Iranian reply came and went
and nothing happened. Meanwhile, Iran continued to enrich uranium.
Evaluating the proposal objectively, little would have been achieved, even
if the Iranians had agreed to it. The LEU stockpile would have been reduced,
and its quantity would be below what is needed for a complete nuclear weapon
core, but this would remain so for a short time only, since enrichment would
continue. Thus, the uranium transfer proposal bought precious time for the
Iranians, and no uranium enrichment suspension was even discussed.
Meanwhile, the end of the 2009 deadline set by the US for resolving the
Iranian nuclear issue also came and went, and nothing happened. The Iranians
are enriching, the US is hesitating, and the East seems to be quite happy
with the situation. The US year's end deadline proved to be devoid of
substance. The US administration apparently had no fallback plan to deal
with such a situation, and if it had, it did not execute it. Although Iran
formally rejected the above plan, the IAEA director general was quoted as
saying that the plan was still on the table. One wonders what this would
achieve if it were now accepted by the Iranians, except for a further delay
of a comprehensive solution to the issue and a continuing enrichment of
uranium by Iran. Time is running short, and action is needed if Iran's
almost inevitable achievement is to be thwarted.
The main solution, agreed to by almost all involved, is to level strong
sanctions. However, there is a lack of consensus on what these should be and
how to apply them. Recently, the idea has been floated that sanctions should
be applied mainly on those who are involved in Iran's nuclear project - the
Revolutionary Guards. It is a worthy notion, but almost impossible to
implement. It is worthy, because it would not affect the man in the street,
who is anyway oppressed by the regime. It is impossible to implement,
because it is quite difficult to think of any effective sanctions that would
target only the Revolutionary Guards.
The only sanctions that make sense that could influence the Iranian regime
to cave in and at least suspend the uranium enrichment program and agree to
institute the inspections according to the Additional Protocol are the
Iraqi-type sanctions. These should limit imports into Iran of anything but
foodstuffs, medicines, and other humanitarian aid, if and when necessary. No
other imports including oil distillates or technical equipment would be
supplied to Iran until it agrees to the above conditions. It is a mistake to
assume that any less severe sanctions would do the trick. Iran would go on
and continue enriching without giving much thought to the outside pressure.
If this is not undertaken by the Security Council, the US should implement
it with all the friends it can muster.
What would happen if this is not done? The one remaining way to prevent Iran
from becoming a nuclear power is military action against Iran's nuclear
installations. This is a route fraught with dangers and uncertainties.
Depending on how successful the attack would be, the Iranian program could
suffer a severe setback. However, there is a high probability that Iran
would attempt to retaliate. Moreover, the Iranians would be able to
reestablish their facilities within a few years and the vicious cycle would
recommence. If both suggested routes of action are not applied or they fail
to achieve the expected results, then within a few years a nuclear Iran will
likely emerge and begin activating its plans for regional hegemony. This
would cause a major upset of power distribution in the region, possible new
wars, and possibly the complete loss of American hegemony in the Gulf
region. On a global scale, the nuclear non-proliferation regime would
suffer, perhaps beyond repair.
Unfortunately, it is the latter possibility that seems to be in the offing.
Unless the US - which for all its rhetoric seems resigned to this outcome -
takes strong sanctions action now, this is probably what will happen. Iran
should not be given the time to accomplish this.
--
Mission
The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) is an independent academic institute that studies key issues relating to Israel's national security and Middle East affairs. Through its mixture of researchers with backgrounds in academia, the military, government, and public policy, INSS is able to contribute to the public debate and governmental deliberation of leading strategic issues and offer policy analysis and recommendations to decision makers and public leaders, policy analysts, and theoreticians, both in Israel and abroad. As part of its mission, it is committed to encourage new ways of thinking and expand the traditional contours of establishment analysis.
Conceiving of security studies as a dynamic interdisciplinary field that involves military, intellectual, economic, and social resources, the Institute strives to reflect that diversity and complexity through research and policy recommendations of the highest standard. Complementing the traditional areas of defense, security doctrine, and politics, INSS has expanded its focus to include the “softer” components of national security, such as domestic trends and social processes.
The Institute is non-partisan, independent, and autonomous in its fields of research and expressed opinions. As an external institute of Tel Aviv University, it maintains a strong association with the academic environment. In addition, it has a strong association with the political and military establishment.
Ephraim Asculai worked at the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) for over 40 years, mainly on issues of nuclear and environmental safety. In 1986, he went to work at the IAEA in Vienna on issues of radiation protection of the public. During 1990-1991 he was the Scientific Secretary of the International Chernobyl Project.
In 1992, Dr. Asculai returned to Israel and became heavily involved in the deliberations leading to the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In his final period at the IAEC he served as the Director of External Relations. During his sabbatical at the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, D.C. he authored Verification Revisited: The Nuclear Case, published by the ISIS Press.
Dr. Asculai retired from the civil service in 2001. In 2002 he joined the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (now incorporated into the Institute for National Security Studies). He has since published several papers dealing with WMD non-proliferation in general, and Middle East issues in particular, including the monograph Rethinking the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime in 2004.
He received his Ph.D. in Atmospheric Sciences from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.
View the original publication at the Institute for National Security Studies
View this article on www.israelbehindthenews.com
very happy indeed. Iran managed to gain another crucial year in its quest
for a nuclear weapons capability, and every passing day brings it closer to
its ultimate goal: having the potential to produce deliverable nuclear
weapons in short order, if it so decides. It successfully delayed the West
from pursuing a more severe sanctions regime, and the West is behaving as if
it has all the time in the world. It does not.
How did this come about? Several factors combined to achieve the net result,
most of them not of Iran's doing: the election of a new US president who
believed in engagement as the sole way to resolve conflicts (and may still
want to believe this); the unwillingness, for years, of the IAEA to
acknowledge Iran's ultimate goal; the (unclassified) 2007 US National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that raised the possibility that Iran abandoned
its quest for nuclear weapons; the reluctance of the US to assume the lead
role in confronting Iran, and letting the EU-3 deal, albeit ineffectively,
with the situation; the contrary attitude of Russia and China, which are
watching the West struggle to find a solution while throwing it a bone from
time to time in supporting some sanctions resolutions that are not achieving
their aim; and the exceptional spanner in the works embedded in the quite
unproductive suggestion to transfer some of Iran's low enriched uranium
(LEU) outside the country and return it as medium enriched uranium fuel for
its Tehran Research Reactor. This last statement needs some explanation.
On October 1, 2009, the P5 +1 (the five permanent Security Council members
plus Germany) and Iran began talks in Geneva that were supposed to deal with
a host of issues, including the suspension of Iran's uranium enrichment
activities. Meantime, the US proposed the said uranium transfer idea. The
rationale was, apparently, to remove the major portion of the LEU from Iran,
thus delaying Iran's potential to produce the core of its first nuclear
explosive device. The talks were then postponed for more than a month, the
IAEA produced a text of an agreement accepted by the Russian, US, and
Iranian delegations, and the Iranians went home to obtain the approval of
the agreement by their government. The government probably never had any
intention of approving this. The deadline for an Iranian reply came and went
and nothing happened. Meanwhile, Iran continued to enrich uranium.
Evaluating the proposal objectively, little would have been achieved, even
if the Iranians had agreed to it. The LEU stockpile would have been reduced,
and its quantity would be below what is needed for a complete nuclear weapon
core, but this would remain so for a short time only, since enrichment would
continue. Thus, the uranium transfer proposal bought precious time for the
Iranians, and no uranium enrichment suspension was even discussed.
Meanwhile, the end of the 2009 deadline set by the US for resolving the
Iranian nuclear issue also came and went, and nothing happened. The Iranians
are enriching, the US is hesitating, and the East seems to be quite happy
with the situation. The US year's end deadline proved to be devoid of
substance. The US administration apparently had no fallback plan to deal
with such a situation, and if it had, it did not execute it. Although Iran
formally rejected the above plan, the IAEA director general was quoted as
saying that the plan was still on the table. One wonders what this would
achieve if it were now accepted by the Iranians, except for a further delay
of a comprehensive solution to the issue and a continuing enrichment of
uranium by Iran. Time is running short, and action is needed if Iran's
almost inevitable achievement is to be thwarted.
The main solution, agreed to by almost all involved, is to level strong
sanctions. However, there is a lack of consensus on what these should be and
how to apply them. Recently, the idea has been floated that sanctions should
be applied mainly on those who are involved in Iran's nuclear project - the
Revolutionary Guards. It is a worthy notion, but almost impossible to
implement. It is worthy, because it would not affect the man in the street,
who is anyway oppressed by the regime. It is impossible to implement,
because it is quite difficult to think of any effective sanctions that would
target only the Revolutionary Guards.
The only sanctions that make sense that could influence the Iranian regime
to cave in and at least suspend the uranium enrichment program and agree to
institute the inspections according to the Additional Protocol are the
Iraqi-type sanctions. These should limit imports into Iran of anything but
foodstuffs, medicines, and other humanitarian aid, if and when necessary. No
other imports including oil distillates or technical equipment would be
supplied to Iran until it agrees to the above conditions. It is a mistake to
assume that any less severe sanctions would do the trick. Iran would go on
and continue enriching without giving much thought to the outside pressure.
If this is not undertaken by the Security Council, the US should implement
it with all the friends it can muster.
What would happen if this is not done? The one remaining way to prevent Iran
from becoming a nuclear power is military action against Iran's nuclear
installations. This is a route fraught with dangers and uncertainties.
Depending on how successful the attack would be, the Iranian program could
suffer a severe setback. However, there is a high probability that Iran
would attempt to retaliate. Moreover, the Iranians would be able to
reestablish their facilities within a few years and the vicious cycle would
recommence. If both suggested routes of action are not applied or they fail
to achieve the expected results, then within a few years a nuclear Iran will
likely emerge and begin activating its plans for regional hegemony. This
would cause a major upset of power distribution in the region, possible new
wars, and possibly the complete loss of American hegemony in the Gulf
region. On a global scale, the nuclear non-proliferation regime would
suffer, perhaps beyond repair.
Unfortunately, it is the latter possibility that seems to be in the offing.
Unless the US - which for all its rhetoric seems resigned to this outcome -
takes strong sanctions action now, this is probably what will happen. Iran
should not be given the time to accomplish this.
--
Mission
The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) is an independent academic institute that studies key issues relating to Israel's national security and Middle East affairs. Through its mixture of researchers with backgrounds in academia, the military, government, and public policy, INSS is able to contribute to the public debate and governmental deliberation of leading strategic issues and offer policy analysis and recommendations to decision makers and public leaders, policy analysts, and theoreticians, both in Israel and abroad. As part of its mission, it is committed to encourage new ways of thinking and expand the traditional contours of establishment analysis.
Conceiving of security studies as a dynamic interdisciplinary field that involves military, intellectual, economic, and social resources, the Institute strives to reflect that diversity and complexity through research and policy recommendations of the highest standard. Complementing the traditional areas of defense, security doctrine, and politics, INSS has expanded its focus to include the “softer” components of national security, such as domestic trends and social processes.
The Institute is non-partisan, independent, and autonomous in its fields of research and expressed opinions. As an external institute of Tel Aviv University, it maintains a strong association with the academic environment. In addition, it has a strong association with the political and military establishment.
Ephraim Asculai worked at the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) for over 40 years, mainly on issues of nuclear and environmental safety. In 1986, he went to work at the IAEA in Vienna on issues of radiation protection of the public. During 1990-1991 he was the Scientific Secretary of the International Chernobyl Project.
In 1992, Dr. Asculai returned to Israel and became heavily involved in the deliberations leading to the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In his final period at the IAEC he served as the Director of External Relations. During his sabbatical at the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, D.C. he authored Verification Revisited: The Nuclear Case, published by the ISIS Press.
Dr. Asculai retired from the civil service in 2001. In 2002 he joined the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (now incorporated into the Institute for National Security Studies). He has since published several papers dealing with WMD non-proliferation in general, and Middle East issues in particular, including the monograph Rethinking the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime in 2004.
He received his Ph.D. in Atmospheric Sciences from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.
View the original publication at the Institute for National Security Studies
View this article on www.israelbehindthenews.com
Saturday, December 12, 2009
The Philadelphia Bulletin: Israel, India Intensify Their Military Cooperation
by David Bedein
JERUSALEM - This week, India and Israel launched another defense summit.
The two countries convened their military chiefs for a five-day summit to review defense and military cooperation.
Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi represented Israel and was invited by his Indian counterpart, Gen. Deepak Kapoor.
“The visit to India is part of the process of strengthening the ties between Israel and India and the nations’ militaries,” a statement by the Israeli military statement said last Sunday.
Israeli military sources said Mr. Ashkenazi and Mr. Kapoor reviewed strategic relations, assessing the regional situation, including Al Qaida, and discussing experiences with new weapons and techniques. They said the review would help India decide on new weapons procurement programs with Israel.
“This was the first official visit of an Israel Defense Forces chief to India,” the statement said.
Israel has been deemed the leading military supplier of India.
The Indian military has been absorbing airborne early-warning and alert aircraft, air defense systems, aircraft upgrades, unmanned aerial vehicles, missile defense systems and light armament from Israel.
“In the past year, Israel has overtaken Russia as its main defense equipment supplier, and about 30 percent of India’s defense imports come from Israel, and that number is growing,” Indian defense analyst Behram Sahukar told the Jerusalem Post.
India has sought to intensify defense and military relations in wake of the Al Qaida-aligned Mumbai attacks in November 2008, in which six Israelis and Jews were killed.
India has deemed the acquisition of naval reconnaissance and counter-insurgency systems a priority.
“Both India and Israel want to expand their military exercises, especially for the air force,” an Israeli military source confirmed.
View the original article in the Philadelphia Bulletin
JERUSALEM - This week, India and Israel launched another defense summit.
The two countries convened their military chiefs for a five-day summit to review defense and military cooperation.
Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi represented Israel and was invited by his Indian counterpart, Gen. Deepak Kapoor.
“The visit to India is part of the process of strengthening the ties between Israel and India and the nations’ militaries,” a statement by the Israeli military statement said last Sunday.
Israeli military sources said Mr. Ashkenazi and Mr. Kapoor reviewed strategic relations, assessing the regional situation, including Al Qaida, and discussing experiences with new weapons and techniques. They said the review would help India decide on new weapons procurement programs with Israel.
“This was the first official visit of an Israel Defense Forces chief to India,” the statement said.
Israel has been deemed the leading military supplier of India.
The Indian military has been absorbing airborne early-warning and alert aircraft, air defense systems, aircraft upgrades, unmanned aerial vehicles, missile defense systems and light armament from Israel.
“In the past year, Israel has overtaken Russia as its main defense equipment supplier, and about 30 percent of India’s defense imports come from Israel, and that number is growing,” Indian defense analyst Behram Sahukar told the Jerusalem Post.
India has sought to intensify defense and military relations in wake of the Al Qaida-aligned Mumbai attacks in November 2008, in which six Israelis and Jews were killed.
India has deemed the acquisition of naval reconnaissance and counter-insurgency systems a priority.
“Both India and Israel want to expand their military exercises, especially for the air force,” an Israeli military source confirmed.
View the original article in the Philadelphia Bulletin
Sunday, October 25, 2009
The Philadelphia Bulletin: Vienna Agreement Has Israelis Uneasy
by David Bedein
Jerusalem - The talks at the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna ended in a draft agreement according to which Iran would transfer most of the uranium in its possession for enrichment outside its borders.
The fact that this refers to “most of the uranium” and not all of it, leaves a breach for a thief to slip through. Who can know for certain and who in Iran can force the regime to adhere to the Vienna agreement? The “small quantity” of uranium can be moved from one nuclear site to another and, at most by an optimistic forecast, the implementation of the agreement can somewhat delay the production of the doomsday weapon.
The news that Iran would hand over most of the low-grade enriched uranium in its possession for enrichment outside its borders was received by Israel as another Iranian victory, which would bring Tehran another step closer to the bomb.
It has not been lost on all Middle Eastern observers that Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s strategic objective is to develop nuclear weapons in order to become a regional power that can dictate the course of events in the Middle East.
His regime is serious, determined and cunning and will not give up such a supreme objective just because the enlightened world demands that it honor a previous commitment, which was given when Iran joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Officially, Israel has refrained from commenting on reports about a possible agreement with Iran, but behind the scenes, Jerusalem is following developments with concern and suspicion.
Israeli officials consider such an agreement as no more than an Iranian tactical move to buy more time and relieve the pressure.
Israel does not believe that Iran will agree to the conditions that the U.S., Russia and France have set, and believes that it will continue its effort to become a nuclear superpower. Israelis have little trust in the chairman of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed El-Baradei, who is involved in the talks.
Evidence of this suspicion could be heard in the statements that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak made yesterday during their meeting with Ms. Susan Rice, the United States ambassador to the United Nations.
Mr. Barak claimed that the superpowers must continue to keep track of Iran’s efforts to obtain nuclear weapons.
“The Iranians have misled the West in the past,” Barak said, pointing out preparations must continue for the imposition of severe sanctions on the Ayatollahs’ regime if it should turn out within several months that the Iranians are not cooperating fully with the international community.
Mr. Barak suggested to Ms. Rice that no alternative, including a military attack, could be ruled out, even if an agreement should be signed in the end, but it is found that Iran has tricked the West once again.
Israeli officials also remind the world that a uranium-enrichment compound, which was discovered in Qom. This stems from the belief, which the U.S. intelligence community shares, that these installations are only part of a more comprehensive network that the Iranians are hiding.
Barak added, in any case, Israel is not taking any option off the table.
View the original article in the Philadelphia Bulletin
Jerusalem - The talks at the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna ended in a draft agreement according to which Iran would transfer most of the uranium in its possession for enrichment outside its borders.
The fact that this refers to “most of the uranium” and not all of it, leaves a breach for a thief to slip through. Who can know for certain and who in Iran can force the regime to adhere to the Vienna agreement? The “small quantity” of uranium can be moved from one nuclear site to another and, at most by an optimistic forecast, the implementation of the agreement can somewhat delay the production of the doomsday weapon.
The news that Iran would hand over most of the low-grade enriched uranium in its possession for enrichment outside its borders was received by Israel as another Iranian victory, which would bring Tehran another step closer to the bomb.
It has not been lost on all Middle Eastern observers that Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s strategic objective is to develop nuclear weapons in order to become a regional power that can dictate the course of events in the Middle East.
His regime is serious, determined and cunning and will not give up such a supreme objective just because the enlightened world demands that it honor a previous commitment, which was given when Iran joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Officially, Israel has refrained from commenting on reports about a possible agreement with Iran, but behind the scenes, Jerusalem is following developments with concern and suspicion.
Israeli officials consider such an agreement as no more than an Iranian tactical move to buy more time and relieve the pressure.
Israel does not believe that Iran will agree to the conditions that the U.S., Russia and France have set, and believes that it will continue its effort to become a nuclear superpower. Israelis have little trust in the chairman of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed El-Baradei, who is involved in the talks.
Evidence of this suspicion could be heard in the statements that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak made yesterday during their meeting with Ms. Susan Rice, the United States ambassador to the United Nations.
Mr. Barak claimed that the superpowers must continue to keep track of Iran’s efforts to obtain nuclear weapons.
“The Iranians have misled the West in the past,” Barak said, pointing out preparations must continue for the imposition of severe sanctions on the Ayatollahs’ regime if it should turn out within several months that the Iranians are not cooperating fully with the international community.
Mr. Barak suggested to Ms. Rice that no alternative, including a military attack, could be ruled out, even if an agreement should be signed in the end, but it is found that Iran has tricked the West once again.
Israeli officials also remind the world that a uranium-enrichment compound, which was discovered in Qom. This stems from the belief, which the U.S. intelligence community shares, that these installations are only part of a more comprehensive network that the Iranians are hiding.
Barak added, in any case, Israel is not taking any option off the table.
View the original article in the Philadelphia Bulletin
Thursday, May 7, 2009
The Philadelphia Bulletin: Report: Turkey to Break with NATO on Iran
by David Bedein
A report issued by the Washington Institute says Turkey has moved steadily away from its NATO allies and toward Iran, Russia and Syria.
The report, titled “The AKP’s Foreign Policy: The Misnomer of Neo-Ottomanism” and authored by senior researcher Soner Cagaptay, says Turkey’s new foreign policy - led by the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP according to its Turkish initials - has come at the expense of Ankara’s relations with Israel, the European Union and the United States.
“Ankara will likely opt out of a NATO consensus on Iran, clash with the United States on how to handle Hamas and Hezbollah, and disagree with the EU and the U.S. on Russia,” the report said.
The report says Turkey has developed friendlier relations with Russia and the Islamic world than with the West. Mr. Cagaptay cited Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Syria as examples of Turkey’s growing ties in the Islamic world.
“The AKP’s foreign policy has a weakness for Arab Islamists and their causes,” the report said. “The policy shows empathy towards Middle East Muslims and Islamists, though the same empathy is missing towards non-Muslims and non-Middle Eastern issues. Business deals play an important role in sustaining the stronger ties that Turkey is developing with Russia, the Persian Gulf states, Sudan and Iran.”
At the same time, Turkey refused to support Georgia during its brief war with Russia in 2008. The report said Turkey has also ignored its Central Asian neighbors, such as Azerbaijan and Georgia, to focus on relations with Russia.
Mr. Cagaptay wrote AKP, most of whose leaders speak Arabic and were educated in Muslim schools, has divided the world in religious blocs - either Christian or Muslim. AKP, which won power in 2002 and dominates parliament, has avoided criticism of Iran’s nuclear program while maintaining ties with Tehran’s proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah.
“It [AKP] is pro-Hamas, pro-Syria, pro-Hezbollah, pro-Qatar, pro-Saudi,” the report said. “The AKP views the world as composed of religious blocs, and this disposition colors its views of the Middle East and the world.”
See this story in the Philadelphia Bulletin
See this story at Israel Behind the News
A report issued by the Washington Institute says Turkey has moved steadily away from its NATO allies and toward Iran, Russia and Syria.
The report, titled “The AKP’s Foreign Policy: The Misnomer of Neo-Ottomanism” and authored by senior researcher Soner Cagaptay, says Turkey’s new foreign policy - led by the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP according to its Turkish initials - has come at the expense of Ankara’s relations with Israel, the European Union and the United States.
“Ankara will likely opt out of a NATO consensus on Iran, clash with the United States on how to handle Hamas and Hezbollah, and disagree with the EU and the U.S. on Russia,” the report said.
The report says Turkey has developed friendlier relations with Russia and the Islamic world than with the West. Mr. Cagaptay cited Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Syria as examples of Turkey’s growing ties in the Islamic world.
“The AKP’s foreign policy has a weakness for Arab Islamists and their causes,” the report said. “The policy shows empathy towards Middle East Muslims and Islamists, though the same empathy is missing towards non-Muslims and non-Middle Eastern issues. Business deals play an important role in sustaining the stronger ties that Turkey is developing with Russia, the Persian Gulf states, Sudan and Iran.”
At the same time, Turkey refused to support Georgia during its brief war with Russia in 2008. The report said Turkey has also ignored its Central Asian neighbors, such as Azerbaijan and Georgia, to focus on relations with Russia.
Mr. Cagaptay wrote AKP, most of whose leaders speak Arabic and were educated in Muslim schools, has divided the world in religious blocs - either Christian or Muslim. AKP, which won power in 2002 and dominates parliament, has avoided criticism of Iran’s nuclear program while maintaining ties with Tehran’s proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah.
“It [AKP] is pro-Hamas, pro-Syria, pro-Hezbollah, pro-Qatar, pro-Saudi,” the report said. “The AKP views the world as composed of religious blocs, and this disposition colors its views of the Middle East and the world.”
See this story in the Philadelphia Bulletin
See this story at Israel Behind the News
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