by Anne Bayefsky
Iran has confirmed it will no longer run for a seat on the Geneva-based U.N. Human Rights Council. Instead, it aims to become a member of an international women's rights body.
Iran's bid to win one of four HRC seats earmarked for Asia had drawn strong opposition from rights campaigners already critical of the presence of countries with poor rights records - including China, Cuba and Saudi Arabia - on the 47-member body.
Iran's withdrawal means that the remaining candidates for the four Asia seats - Qatar, Malaysia, Thailand and the Maldives - are all but assured of success when the full 192-member U.N. General Assembly on May 13 elects 14 HRC members.
Iran made the decision to end its candidature after discussions with other members of the U.N.'s Asia group, Tehran's foreign ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast said Sunday.
Hinting at a quid pro quo, he said that Iran would instead be a candidate for an international women's rights body - "and all Asian countries will support our membership."
It was not immediately clear which body he meant. Iran's ILNA news agency quoted Mehmanparast as saying the "Women's Human Rights Council" while IRNA quoted him as saying the "International Commission for Protection of Women's Rights."
There are two main U.N. bodies relating to women's rights. The 23-member Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) holds elections in June for 11 vacancies, but the nomination list closed in March and Iran is not on it. The 45-member Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) will have two Asia seat vacancies early next year, when Pakistan's and Cambodia's terms end.
Whatever the case, the prospect that Iran - with the support of other Asian states - will take a seat on a body charged with promoting the rights of women is certain to stoke controversy.
"Putting fundamentalist Iran in charge of a women's rights commission is like putting a pyromaniac as chief of the fire department," Hillel Neuer, director of the Geneva-based U.N. Watch, said late Sunday. "It's an outrage, and completely unacceptable."
Among the reasons Iranian and other human rights advocates gave for urging governments to block Iran's HRC candidacy was its treatment of women.
In a letter to U.N. member states last week one of Iran's most prominent rights advocates, the exiled Nobel peace prize laureate Shirin Ebadi, urged them to reject the candidacy of a country "which has been violating human rights for years."
Ebadi gave examples of discrimination faced by Iranian women, including the fact that "blood money" - the prescribed amount paid to the heirs of a murder victim - for a woman is half the sum of that for a man.
"The testimony of two women is equivalent to the testimony of one man," she wrote. "A man is permitted to have four wives and divorce any of them without giving any reasons."
Ebadi said that women in Iran who seek equal rights are charged with conspiring to overthrow the Islamic Republic. More than 100 such women currently faced criminal charges.
Another letter sent to U.N. members last week urging them to block Iran's HRC bid came from 12 top Iranian human rights activists, who said women in the country were treated as "second class citizens."
The State Department's most recent international human rights report, released last month, noted that Iranian women face discrimination even in the administration of some of the most controversial shari'a punishments, such as stoning for adultery.
"The law provides that a victim of stoning is allowed to go free if he or she escapes," the report said. "It is much harder for women to escape, as they are buried to their necks, whereas men are buried only to their waists."
'With or without Iran, council lacks credibility'
Iran's withdrawal from next month's HRC election followed behind-the-scenes lobbying by the U.S. and other Western members.
The decision drew widespread praise from human rights advocates and others, and U.S. officials characterized it as a sign the council was moving in the right direction.
Anne Bayefsky, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and editor of Eye on the U.N., disagreed that the development showed the HRC was becoming a serious agency for promoting human rights.
"At the last council session, no resolution on Iran's abysmal human rights record was even presented let alone adopted," she said Sunday. "There has never been any special session of the council on Iran, though the events of last June's election and subsequent crackdown cried out for serious attention."
Bayefsky recalled that when Iran went through the council's "universal periodic review" mechanism earlier this year the process "ended with a round of applause for Iran."
"So the fact that Iran is not a member of the council has not made the slightest difference to the council's total unwillingness to do anything about human rights in Iran."
Noting the presence on the council of "countries with some of the worst human rights situations on the planet" - such as Saudi Arabia, China, Cuba and Russia - Bayefsky said that "adding or subtracting Iranian membership is hardly determinative of the council's credibility."
'What about Libya?'
The last time Tehran stood for a seat on the HRC was 2006, when the council was established to replace the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). Iran was one of 18 countries competing for 13 Asian seats and got the second lowest number of votes, with only Iraq doing worse.
Since that first election, the amount of competition for seats has fallen sharply.
Barring any last minute entries, on May 13 neither Asia nor any of the other geographical groups - Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Western group - will offer any contest. All have "closed slates" - the same number of candidates as there are available seats.
Human rights organizations have argued that a lack of competition has helped violators to get seats.
Neuer of U.N. Watch drew attention Sunday to the likelihood of Libya winning a seat next month.
Although an official U.N. list of candidates does not currently include any African country, diplomats say Libya is one of four African candidates for four available African seats.
"Libya persecutes its two million black African migrants, for which it has been denounced by the U.N. itself," Neuer said. He also cited the torture of a Palestinian doctor and Bulgarian nurses accused of deliberately infecting Libyan children with the HIV virus, and Libya's incarceration of a Swiss businessman after Muammar Gaddafi's son was arrested in 2008 and accused of assaulting personal staff at a Geneva hotel.
Neuer drew a contrast between Western opposition to Iran's HRC bid and Libya's.
"Western states are doing nothing about this because they now buy Libyan oil, and because Gaddafi has for now sworn off terrorism, and is in a kind of post-rogue recovery program," he said.
"Western states who are on the council know that Libya will be elected, and fear the impact this could have on the perceived credibility of the council. "Regrettably, they have more fear about the PR consequences - how the people will view what the foreign policy elites are doing in Geneva - than they do of the actual damage that Libya's presence on the council will cause," Neuer added.
Libya was not only a member of the now defunct UNCHR, but in 2003 it was nominated by the African group to chair that body.
The Bush administration opposed the move and for the first time in the commission's history, the U.S. forced a vote, breaking with the tradition of filling the chairmanship "by acclamation."
Libya won by 33 votes to three (it was a secret ballot, but the three votes were understood to have come from the U.S., Canada and Guatemala). Another 17 UNCHR members - including European Union nations - abstained.
Anne Bayefsky, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and editor of Eye on the U.N., disagreed that the development showed the HRC was becoming a serious agency for promoting human rights.
"At the last council session, no resolution on Iran's abysmal human rights record was even presented let alone adopted," she said Sunday. "There has never been any special session of the council on Iran, though the events of last June's election and subsequent crackdown cried out for serious attention."
Bayefsky recalled that when Iran went through the council's "universal periodic review" mechanism earlier this year the process "ended with a round of applause for Iran."
"So the fact that Iran is not a member of the council has not made the slightest difference to the council's total unwillingness to do anything about human rights in Iran."
Noting the presence on the council of "countries with some of the worst human rights situations on the planet" - such as Saudi Arabia, China, Cuba and Russia - Bayefsky said that "adding or subtracting Iranian membership is hardly determinative of the council's credibility."
See this story at CNSNews
See this story here at Israel Behind the News
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Sunday, May 2, 2010
Confirmed Israel Intelligence Study: Saudis Will Now Pose a Nuclear Threat - Yet It Goes Virtually Unreported in Israel
Saudi Arabia, the only Arab nation contiguous to Israel which remains in a total state of war with Israel since 1948, has taken a step towards posing a nuclear threat against Jerusalem. This past week, The Tel Aviv based Institute of National Security Studies issued a report which confirms the ata that Riyad has been working to prepare a nuclear infrastructure.
That report can be found at: http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=3973
The report, entitled "The Saudi Nuclear Option", authored by a senior intelligence analyst, Yoel Guzansky, asserts that Pakistan will be the most likely developer of a Saudi nuclear option
The report said that a key Saudi option involved the Saudi alliance with Pakistan, which has received billions of dollars from the Gulf Cooperation Council kingdom for strategic programs. In the words of the report...”Should Saudi Arabia find itself in a sensitive security situation, it may well be that it would seek to capitalize on its investment in the Pakistani program."
The report went in to say that “Despite Saudi Arabia’s relative transparency and cooperation with the international community on nuclear issues, there are more than a few doubts as to its credibility, given that in the past it had very close relations with Pakistan," the report said. "More than once the claim has been made that Saudi Arabia was in fact behind the financing of Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs. After the Islamic revolution and throughout the 1980s Pakistan stationed military forces in Saudi Arabia and the two nations cooperated in assisting the Afghani mujahadeen."
The report also stated that Pakistan wields the manpower and technology for the nuclear weapons program for Saudi Arabia.
In the 1980s, Saudi Arabia procured the Chinese-origin CSS-2 surface-to-surface missiles from Pakistan. The CSS-2, although not regarded as accurate, was designed to contain a nuclear warhead.
"Various developments therefore may lead Saudi Arabia to accelerate its timetable, and along with or instead of developing independent nuclear
infrastructures, it is not inconceivable that it would prefer buying turnkey components, enter into a military treaty with Pakistan, and in certain
scenarios, even deploy Pakistani nuclear forces on Saudi soil because of the urgency and its lack of appropriate infrastructures," the report said.
This seminal study has hardly been reported in Israel - because INSS couched Saudi's nuclear option only as a response to a possible Iranian threat against Saudi Arabia.
Yet Saudi Arabia is not in a state of war with Iran.
Saudi Arabia is in a state of war with Israel, expressed in terms of consistent Saudi aid to Palestinian terrorist organizations, and Saudi funding for middle east studies programs on Unversity campuses around the world which prepare the next geneation of intellectuals to carry on the war with Israel and with Zionism.
View this story at Israel Behind the News
That report can be found at: http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=3973
The report, entitled "The Saudi Nuclear Option", authored by a senior intelligence analyst, Yoel Guzansky, asserts that Pakistan will be the most likely developer of a Saudi nuclear option
The report said that a key Saudi option involved the Saudi alliance with Pakistan, which has received billions of dollars from the Gulf Cooperation Council kingdom for strategic programs. In the words of the report...”Should Saudi Arabia find itself in a sensitive security situation, it may well be that it would seek to capitalize on its investment in the Pakistani program."
The report went in to say that “Despite Saudi Arabia’s relative transparency and cooperation with the international community on nuclear issues, there are more than a few doubts as to its credibility, given that in the past it had very close relations with Pakistan," the report said. "More than once the claim has been made that Saudi Arabia was in fact behind the financing of Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs. After the Islamic revolution and throughout the 1980s Pakistan stationed military forces in Saudi Arabia and the two nations cooperated in assisting the Afghani mujahadeen."
The report also stated that Pakistan wields the manpower and technology for the nuclear weapons program for Saudi Arabia.
In the 1980s, Saudi Arabia procured the Chinese-origin CSS-2 surface-to-surface missiles from Pakistan. The CSS-2, although not regarded as accurate, was designed to contain a nuclear warhead.
"Various developments therefore may lead Saudi Arabia to accelerate its timetable, and along with or instead of developing independent nuclear
infrastructures, it is not inconceivable that it would prefer buying turnkey components, enter into a military treaty with Pakistan, and in certain
scenarios, even deploy Pakistani nuclear forces on Saudi soil because of the urgency and its lack of appropriate infrastructures," the report said.
This seminal study has hardly been reported in Israel - because INSS couched Saudi's nuclear option only as a response to a possible Iranian threat against Saudi Arabia.
Yet Saudi Arabia is not in a state of war with Iran.
Saudi Arabia is in a state of war with Israel, expressed in terms of consistent Saudi aid to Palestinian terrorist organizations, and Saudi funding for middle east studies programs on Unversity campuses around the world which prepare the next geneation of intellectuals to carry on the war with Israel and with Zionism.
View this story at Israel Behind the News
Saturday, April 3, 2010
Former Israel Deputy Defense Minister: Israel Will Attack Iran by November
by Ken Timmerman at NewsMax
Israel will be compelled to attack Iran’s nuclear weapons facilities by this November unless the U.S. and its allies enact “crippling sanctions that will undermine the regime in Tehran,” former deputy defense minister Brig. Gen. Ephraim Sneh said on Wednesday in Tel Aviv.
The sanctions currently being discussed with Russia, China, and other major powers at the United Nations are likely to be a slightly-enhanced version of the U.N. sanctions already in place, which have had no impact on the Iranian regime.
And despite unanimous passage of the Iran Petroleum Sanctions Act in January, the Obama administration continues to resist efforts by Congress to impose mandatory sanctions on companies selling refined petroleum products to Iran.
In an Op-Ed in the Israeli left-wing daily, Haaretz, Sneh argues that Iran will probably have “a nuclear bomb or two” by 2011.
“An Israeli military campaign against Iran’s nuclear installations is likely to cripple that country’s nuclear project for a number of years. The retaliation against Israel would be painful, but bearable.”
Sneh believes that the “acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran during Obama’s term would do him a great deal of political damage,” but that the damage to Obama resulting from an Israeli strike on Iran “would be devastating.”
Nevertheless, he writes, “for practical reasons, in the absence of genuine sanctions, Israel will not be able to wait until the end of next winter, which means it would have to act around the congressional elections in November, thereby sealing Obama’s fate as president.”
Sneh does not foresee any U.S. military strikes on Iran, an analysis that is shared by most observers in Washington, who see the Obama administration moving toward containment as opposed to confrontation with Iran.
In a recent report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), military analyst Anthony Cordesman concluded that Israel will have to use low-yield earth-penetrating nuclear weapons if it wants to take out deeply-buried nuclear sites in Iran.
“Israel is reported to possess a 200 kilogram nuclear warhead containing 6 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium that could be mounted on the sea launched cruise missiles and producing a Yield of 20 kilo tons,” Cordesman writes in the CSIS study he co-authored by Abdullah Toukan.
Israel would be most likely to launch these missiles from its Dolphin-class submarines, he added.
While Sneh is no longer in the Israeli government, his revelation of a drop-dead date for an Israeli military strike on Iran must be taken seriously, Israel-watchers in the U.S. tell Newsmax.
“Ephraim Sneh is a serious guy,” said Malcolm Hoenlein, executive vice chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. “He was deputy minister of defense and has long been focused on the issue of Iran.”
Shoshana Bryen, Senior Director for Security Policy at the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), said that what struck her most about Sneh’s comments was the shift of emphasis from resolving the Palestinian problem to Iran.
“For 30 years, he’s been saying that solving the Palestinian problem is Israel’s biggest priority. Now he’s saying, forget about the Palestinians. Iran is the problem.”
Sneh “is extremely well regarded on the left and the right,” she added. “People respect him enormously.”
In his Op-Ed, Sneh argues that the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu needs to mend its bridges with the United States, and the only way to do so is by enacting an immediate and total ban on any settlement activity, including in Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.
“Without international legitimacy, and with its friend mad at it, Israel would find it very difficult to act on its own” against Iran, he argued.
See the original article at NewsMax
See this and more stories at Israel Behind the News
Israel will be compelled to attack Iran’s nuclear weapons facilities by this November unless the U.S. and its allies enact “crippling sanctions that will undermine the regime in Tehran,” former deputy defense minister Brig. Gen. Ephraim Sneh said on Wednesday in Tel Aviv.
The sanctions currently being discussed with Russia, China, and other major powers at the United Nations are likely to be a slightly-enhanced version of the U.N. sanctions already in place, which have had no impact on the Iranian regime.
And despite unanimous passage of the Iran Petroleum Sanctions Act in January, the Obama administration continues to resist efforts by Congress to impose mandatory sanctions on companies selling refined petroleum products to Iran.
In an Op-Ed in the Israeli left-wing daily, Haaretz, Sneh argues that Iran will probably have “a nuclear bomb or two” by 2011.
“An Israeli military campaign against Iran’s nuclear installations is likely to cripple that country’s nuclear project for a number of years. The retaliation against Israel would be painful, but bearable.”
Sneh believes that the “acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran during Obama’s term would do him a great deal of political damage,” but that the damage to Obama resulting from an Israeli strike on Iran “would be devastating.”
Nevertheless, he writes, “for practical reasons, in the absence of genuine sanctions, Israel will not be able to wait until the end of next winter, which means it would have to act around the congressional elections in November, thereby sealing Obama’s fate as president.”
Sneh does not foresee any U.S. military strikes on Iran, an analysis that is shared by most observers in Washington, who see the Obama administration moving toward containment as opposed to confrontation with Iran.
In a recent report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), military analyst Anthony Cordesman concluded that Israel will have to use low-yield earth-penetrating nuclear weapons if it wants to take out deeply-buried nuclear sites in Iran.
“Israel is reported to possess a 200 kilogram nuclear warhead containing 6 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium that could be mounted on the sea launched cruise missiles and producing a Yield of 20 kilo tons,” Cordesman writes in the CSIS study he co-authored by Abdullah Toukan.
Israel would be most likely to launch these missiles from its Dolphin-class submarines, he added.
While Sneh is no longer in the Israeli government, his revelation of a drop-dead date for an Israeli military strike on Iran must be taken seriously, Israel-watchers in the U.S. tell Newsmax.
“Ephraim Sneh is a serious guy,” said Malcolm Hoenlein, executive vice chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. “He was deputy minister of defense and has long been focused on the issue of Iran.”
Shoshana Bryen, Senior Director for Security Policy at the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), said that what struck her most about Sneh’s comments was the shift of emphasis from resolving the Palestinian problem to Iran.
“For 30 years, he’s been saying that solving the Palestinian problem is Israel’s biggest priority. Now he’s saying, forget about the Palestinians. Iran is the problem.”
Sneh “is extremely well regarded on the left and the right,” she added. “People respect him enormously.”
In his Op-Ed, Sneh argues that the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu needs to mend its bridges with the United States, and the only way to do so is by enacting an immediate and total ban on any settlement activity, including in Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.
“Without international legitimacy, and with its friend mad at it, Israel would find it very difficult to act on its own” against Iran, he argued.
See the original article at NewsMax
See this and more stories at Israel Behind the News
Friday, March 5, 2010
The Philadelphia Bulletin: Differences Emerging between Israel and US over Iran
by David Bedein
JERUSALEM - The intelligence communities of Israel and the United States differ over Iran’s progress toward nuclear weapons.
“I think that beyond that there is, of course, a certain difference in perspective and difference in judgment, difference in the internal clocks and difference in capabilities,” Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak said.
In a Feb. 26 address to the Washington Institute, Mr. Barak acknowledged that Israel and the United States might not bridge their differences over Iran’s capabilities. He said the U.S. objections to Israel’s assessment should not block any campaign against Tehran’s nuclear program.
“And I don’t think that there is a need to coordinate in this regard,” Mr. Barak said. “That should be understood. It should be an exchange of views. We do not need to coordinate every step.”
The statement marked a rare occasion that Mr. Barak, regarded as the most U.S.-oriented member of the Israeli Cabinet, played down the need to coordinate with the administration of President Barack Obama. Mr. Barak, however, stressed that Israel supported Mr. Obama’s policy to employ diplomacy rather than military means against Iran.
“We clearly support the attempt to solve it through diplomacy,” Mr. Barak said.
The Israeli government has been pressing the U.S.administration for a timetable for harsh U.S. sanctions on Tehran, beginning with a gasoline embargo that would spark critical fuel shortages in Iran.
Instead, Washington has moved cautiously in efforts to draft sanctions against Iran. The State Department has ruled out significant measures against Iran’s energy sector.
For his part, Mr. Barak did not rule out the prospect that Iran could develop what he termed “second or second-and-a-half generation of nuclear warheads.” He said these warheads could be installed on ballistic missiles that could reach Moscow or Paris.
“If Iran will not be stopped from moving there, it will reach a certain point of nuclear military capability, and one can close his eyes and see what it means,” Mr. Barak said. “What is really needed is significant sanctions, effective ones with a time limit, together with the Russians and the Chinese.”
See this story in the Philadelphia Bulletin
See this report at Israel Behind the News
JERUSALEM - The intelligence communities of Israel and the United States differ over Iran’s progress toward nuclear weapons.
“I think that beyond that there is, of course, a certain difference in perspective and difference in judgment, difference in the internal clocks and difference in capabilities,” Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak said.
In a Feb. 26 address to the Washington Institute, Mr. Barak acknowledged that Israel and the United States might not bridge their differences over Iran’s capabilities. He said the U.S. objections to Israel’s assessment should not block any campaign against Tehran’s nuclear program.
“And I don’t think that there is a need to coordinate in this regard,” Mr. Barak said. “That should be understood. It should be an exchange of views. We do not need to coordinate every step.”
The statement marked a rare occasion that Mr. Barak, regarded as the most U.S.-oriented member of the Israeli Cabinet, played down the need to coordinate with the administration of President Barack Obama. Mr. Barak, however, stressed that Israel supported Mr. Obama’s policy to employ diplomacy rather than military means against Iran.
“We clearly support the attempt to solve it through diplomacy,” Mr. Barak said.
The Israeli government has been pressing the U.S.administration for a timetable for harsh U.S. sanctions on Tehran, beginning with a gasoline embargo that would spark critical fuel shortages in Iran.
Instead, Washington has moved cautiously in efforts to draft sanctions against Iran. The State Department has ruled out significant measures against Iran’s energy sector.
For his part, Mr. Barak did not rule out the prospect that Iran could develop what he termed “second or second-and-a-half generation of nuclear warheads.” He said these warheads could be installed on ballistic missiles that could reach Moscow or Paris.
“If Iran will not be stopped from moving there, it will reach a certain point of nuclear military capability, and one can close his eyes and see what it means,” Mr. Barak said. “What is really needed is significant sanctions, effective ones with a time limit, together with the Russians and the Chinese.”
See this story in the Philadelphia Bulletin
See this report at Israel Behind the News
Tuesday, January 26, 2010
Iran: The Time Has Come (INSS Insight No. 158, January 25, 2010)
If its domestic situation were not so serious, Iran's government could be
very happy indeed. Iran managed to gain another crucial year in its quest
for a nuclear weapons capability, and every passing day brings it closer to
its ultimate goal: having the potential to produce deliverable nuclear
weapons in short order, if it so decides. It successfully delayed the West
from pursuing a more severe sanctions regime, and the West is behaving as if
it has all the time in the world. It does not.
How did this come about? Several factors combined to achieve the net result,
most of them not of Iran's doing: the election of a new US president who
believed in engagement as the sole way to resolve conflicts (and may still
want to believe this); the unwillingness, for years, of the IAEA to
acknowledge Iran's ultimate goal; the (unclassified) 2007 US National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that raised the possibility that Iran abandoned
its quest for nuclear weapons; the reluctance of the US to assume the lead
role in confronting Iran, and letting the EU-3 deal, albeit ineffectively,
with the situation; the contrary attitude of Russia and China, which are
watching the West struggle to find a solution while throwing it a bone from
time to time in supporting some sanctions resolutions that are not achieving
their aim; and the exceptional spanner in the works embedded in the quite
unproductive suggestion to transfer some of Iran's low enriched uranium
(LEU) outside the country and return it as medium enriched uranium fuel for
its Tehran Research Reactor. This last statement needs some explanation.
On October 1, 2009, the P5 +1 (the five permanent Security Council members
plus Germany) and Iran began talks in Geneva that were supposed to deal with
a host of issues, including the suspension of Iran's uranium enrichment
activities. Meantime, the US proposed the said uranium transfer idea. The
rationale was, apparently, to remove the major portion of the LEU from Iran,
thus delaying Iran's potential to produce the core of its first nuclear
explosive device. The talks were then postponed for more than a month, the
IAEA produced a text of an agreement accepted by the Russian, US, and
Iranian delegations, and the Iranians went home to obtain the approval of
the agreement by their government. The government probably never had any
intention of approving this. The deadline for an Iranian reply came and went
and nothing happened. Meanwhile, Iran continued to enrich uranium.
Evaluating the proposal objectively, little would have been achieved, even
if the Iranians had agreed to it. The LEU stockpile would have been reduced,
and its quantity would be below what is needed for a complete nuclear weapon
core, but this would remain so for a short time only, since enrichment would
continue. Thus, the uranium transfer proposal bought precious time for the
Iranians, and no uranium enrichment suspension was even discussed.
Meanwhile, the end of the 2009 deadline set by the US for resolving the
Iranian nuclear issue also came and went, and nothing happened. The Iranians
are enriching, the US is hesitating, and the East seems to be quite happy
with the situation. The US year's end deadline proved to be devoid of
substance. The US administration apparently had no fallback plan to deal
with such a situation, and if it had, it did not execute it. Although Iran
formally rejected the above plan, the IAEA director general was quoted as
saying that the plan was still on the table. One wonders what this would
achieve if it were now accepted by the Iranians, except for a further delay
of a comprehensive solution to the issue and a continuing enrichment of
uranium by Iran. Time is running short, and action is needed if Iran's
almost inevitable achievement is to be thwarted.
The main solution, agreed to by almost all involved, is to level strong
sanctions. However, there is a lack of consensus on what these should be and
how to apply them. Recently, the idea has been floated that sanctions should
be applied mainly on those who are involved in Iran's nuclear project - the
Revolutionary Guards. It is a worthy notion, but almost impossible to
implement. It is worthy, because it would not affect the man in the street,
who is anyway oppressed by the regime. It is impossible to implement,
because it is quite difficult to think of any effective sanctions that would
target only the Revolutionary Guards.
The only sanctions that make sense that could influence the Iranian regime
to cave in and at least suspend the uranium enrichment program and agree to
institute the inspections according to the Additional Protocol are the
Iraqi-type sanctions. These should limit imports into Iran of anything but
foodstuffs, medicines, and other humanitarian aid, if and when necessary. No
other imports including oil distillates or technical equipment would be
supplied to Iran until it agrees to the above conditions. It is a mistake to
assume that any less severe sanctions would do the trick. Iran would go on
and continue enriching without giving much thought to the outside pressure.
If this is not undertaken by the Security Council, the US should implement
it with all the friends it can muster.
What would happen if this is not done? The one remaining way to prevent Iran
from becoming a nuclear power is military action against Iran's nuclear
installations. This is a route fraught with dangers and uncertainties.
Depending on how successful the attack would be, the Iranian program could
suffer a severe setback. However, there is a high probability that Iran
would attempt to retaliate. Moreover, the Iranians would be able to
reestablish their facilities within a few years and the vicious cycle would
recommence. If both suggested routes of action are not applied or they fail
to achieve the expected results, then within a few years a nuclear Iran will
likely emerge and begin activating its plans for regional hegemony. This
would cause a major upset of power distribution in the region, possible new
wars, and possibly the complete loss of American hegemony in the Gulf
region. On a global scale, the nuclear non-proliferation regime would
suffer, perhaps beyond repair.
Unfortunately, it is the latter possibility that seems to be in the offing.
Unless the US - which for all its rhetoric seems resigned to this outcome -
takes strong sanctions action now, this is probably what will happen. Iran
should not be given the time to accomplish this.
--
Mission
The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) is an independent academic institute that studies key issues relating to Israel's national security and Middle East affairs. Through its mixture of researchers with backgrounds in academia, the military, government, and public policy, INSS is able to contribute to the public debate and governmental deliberation of leading strategic issues and offer policy analysis and recommendations to decision makers and public leaders, policy analysts, and theoreticians, both in Israel and abroad. As part of its mission, it is committed to encourage new ways of thinking and expand the traditional contours of establishment analysis.
Conceiving of security studies as a dynamic interdisciplinary field that involves military, intellectual, economic, and social resources, the Institute strives to reflect that diversity and complexity through research and policy recommendations of the highest standard. Complementing the traditional areas of defense, security doctrine, and politics, INSS has expanded its focus to include the “softer” components of national security, such as domestic trends and social processes.
The Institute is non-partisan, independent, and autonomous in its fields of research and expressed opinions. As an external institute of Tel Aviv University, it maintains a strong association with the academic environment. In addition, it has a strong association with the political and military establishment.
Ephraim Asculai worked at the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) for over 40 years, mainly on issues of nuclear and environmental safety. In 1986, he went to work at the IAEA in Vienna on issues of radiation protection of the public. During 1990-1991 he was the Scientific Secretary of the International Chernobyl Project.
In 1992, Dr. Asculai returned to Israel and became heavily involved in the deliberations leading to the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In his final period at the IAEC he served as the Director of External Relations. During his sabbatical at the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, D.C. he authored Verification Revisited: The Nuclear Case, published by the ISIS Press.
Dr. Asculai retired from the civil service in 2001. In 2002 he joined the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (now incorporated into the Institute for National Security Studies). He has since published several papers dealing with WMD non-proliferation in general, and Middle East issues in particular, including the monograph Rethinking the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime in 2004.
He received his Ph.D. in Atmospheric Sciences from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.
View the original publication at the Institute for National Security Studies
View this article on www.israelbehindthenews.com
very happy indeed. Iran managed to gain another crucial year in its quest
for a nuclear weapons capability, and every passing day brings it closer to
its ultimate goal: having the potential to produce deliverable nuclear
weapons in short order, if it so decides. It successfully delayed the West
from pursuing a more severe sanctions regime, and the West is behaving as if
it has all the time in the world. It does not.
How did this come about? Several factors combined to achieve the net result,
most of them not of Iran's doing: the election of a new US president who
believed in engagement as the sole way to resolve conflicts (and may still
want to believe this); the unwillingness, for years, of the IAEA to
acknowledge Iran's ultimate goal; the (unclassified) 2007 US National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that raised the possibility that Iran abandoned
its quest for nuclear weapons; the reluctance of the US to assume the lead
role in confronting Iran, and letting the EU-3 deal, albeit ineffectively,
with the situation; the contrary attitude of Russia and China, which are
watching the West struggle to find a solution while throwing it a bone from
time to time in supporting some sanctions resolutions that are not achieving
their aim; and the exceptional spanner in the works embedded in the quite
unproductive suggestion to transfer some of Iran's low enriched uranium
(LEU) outside the country and return it as medium enriched uranium fuel for
its Tehran Research Reactor. This last statement needs some explanation.
On October 1, 2009, the P5 +1 (the five permanent Security Council members
plus Germany) and Iran began talks in Geneva that were supposed to deal with
a host of issues, including the suspension of Iran's uranium enrichment
activities. Meantime, the US proposed the said uranium transfer idea. The
rationale was, apparently, to remove the major portion of the LEU from Iran,
thus delaying Iran's potential to produce the core of its first nuclear
explosive device. The talks were then postponed for more than a month, the
IAEA produced a text of an agreement accepted by the Russian, US, and
Iranian delegations, and the Iranians went home to obtain the approval of
the agreement by their government. The government probably never had any
intention of approving this. The deadline for an Iranian reply came and went
and nothing happened. Meanwhile, Iran continued to enrich uranium.
Evaluating the proposal objectively, little would have been achieved, even
if the Iranians had agreed to it. The LEU stockpile would have been reduced,
and its quantity would be below what is needed for a complete nuclear weapon
core, but this would remain so for a short time only, since enrichment would
continue. Thus, the uranium transfer proposal bought precious time for the
Iranians, and no uranium enrichment suspension was even discussed.
Meanwhile, the end of the 2009 deadline set by the US for resolving the
Iranian nuclear issue also came and went, and nothing happened. The Iranians
are enriching, the US is hesitating, and the East seems to be quite happy
with the situation. The US year's end deadline proved to be devoid of
substance. The US administration apparently had no fallback plan to deal
with such a situation, and if it had, it did not execute it. Although Iran
formally rejected the above plan, the IAEA director general was quoted as
saying that the plan was still on the table. One wonders what this would
achieve if it were now accepted by the Iranians, except for a further delay
of a comprehensive solution to the issue and a continuing enrichment of
uranium by Iran. Time is running short, and action is needed if Iran's
almost inevitable achievement is to be thwarted.
The main solution, agreed to by almost all involved, is to level strong
sanctions. However, there is a lack of consensus on what these should be and
how to apply them. Recently, the idea has been floated that sanctions should
be applied mainly on those who are involved in Iran's nuclear project - the
Revolutionary Guards. It is a worthy notion, but almost impossible to
implement. It is worthy, because it would not affect the man in the street,
who is anyway oppressed by the regime. It is impossible to implement,
because it is quite difficult to think of any effective sanctions that would
target only the Revolutionary Guards.
The only sanctions that make sense that could influence the Iranian regime
to cave in and at least suspend the uranium enrichment program and agree to
institute the inspections according to the Additional Protocol are the
Iraqi-type sanctions. These should limit imports into Iran of anything but
foodstuffs, medicines, and other humanitarian aid, if and when necessary. No
other imports including oil distillates or technical equipment would be
supplied to Iran until it agrees to the above conditions. It is a mistake to
assume that any less severe sanctions would do the trick. Iran would go on
and continue enriching without giving much thought to the outside pressure.
If this is not undertaken by the Security Council, the US should implement
it with all the friends it can muster.
What would happen if this is not done? The one remaining way to prevent Iran
from becoming a nuclear power is military action against Iran's nuclear
installations. This is a route fraught with dangers and uncertainties.
Depending on how successful the attack would be, the Iranian program could
suffer a severe setback. However, there is a high probability that Iran
would attempt to retaliate. Moreover, the Iranians would be able to
reestablish their facilities within a few years and the vicious cycle would
recommence. If both suggested routes of action are not applied or they fail
to achieve the expected results, then within a few years a nuclear Iran will
likely emerge and begin activating its plans for regional hegemony. This
would cause a major upset of power distribution in the region, possible new
wars, and possibly the complete loss of American hegemony in the Gulf
region. On a global scale, the nuclear non-proliferation regime would
suffer, perhaps beyond repair.
Unfortunately, it is the latter possibility that seems to be in the offing.
Unless the US - which for all its rhetoric seems resigned to this outcome -
takes strong sanctions action now, this is probably what will happen. Iran
should not be given the time to accomplish this.
--
Mission
The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) is an independent academic institute that studies key issues relating to Israel's national security and Middle East affairs. Through its mixture of researchers with backgrounds in academia, the military, government, and public policy, INSS is able to contribute to the public debate and governmental deliberation of leading strategic issues and offer policy analysis and recommendations to decision makers and public leaders, policy analysts, and theoreticians, both in Israel and abroad. As part of its mission, it is committed to encourage new ways of thinking and expand the traditional contours of establishment analysis.
Conceiving of security studies as a dynamic interdisciplinary field that involves military, intellectual, economic, and social resources, the Institute strives to reflect that diversity and complexity through research and policy recommendations of the highest standard. Complementing the traditional areas of defense, security doctrine, and politics, INSS has expanded its focus to include the “softer” components of national security, such as domestic trends and social processes.
The Institute is non-partisan, independent, and autonomous in its fields of research and expressed opinions. As an external institute of Tel Aviv University, it maintains a strong association with the academic environment. In addition, it has a strong association with the political and military establishment.
Ephraim Asculai worked at the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) for over 40 years, mainly on issues of nuclear and environmental safety. In 1986, he went to work at the IAEA in Vienna on issues of radiation protection of the public. During 1990-1991 he was the Scientific Secretary of the International Chernobyl Project.
In 1992, Dr. Asculai returned to Israel and became heavily involved in the deliberations leading to the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In his final period at the IAEC he served as the Director of External Relations. During his sabbatical at the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, D.C. he authored Verification Revisited: The Nuclear Case, published by the ISIS Press.
Dr. Asculai retired from the civil service in 2001. In 2002 he joined the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (now incorporated into the Institute for National Security Studies). He has since published several papers dealing with WMD non-proliferation in general, and Middle East issues in particular, including the monograph Rethinking the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime in 2004.
He received his Ph.D. in Atmospheric Sciences from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.
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