From: Middle East News Line
The U.S. Army has commissioned a study that concluded
that conventional ground forces would be required to battle the
Iranian-sponsored Hizbullah.
The Rand Corp. has relayed a study to the U.S. Army that analyzed
Israel's 2006 war with Hizbullah. The report, titled "Military Capabilities
for Hybrid War," concluded that Israel's air combat strategy against
Hizbullah was flawed and that infantry and armor would be required to fight
the Lebanese-based militia, trained by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps.
"Finally, heavy forces -- based on tanks and infantry fighting
vehicles -- are key elements of any force that will fight sophisticated
irregular opponents, because they reduce operational risk and minimize
friendly casualties," the report, released on April 9, said.
The report was part of a project by the U.S. Army to assess emerging
insurgency threats based on Israel's wars with Hizbullah and Hamas over the
last four years. Rand said both Israel and the United States were facing a
so-called hybrid opponent, or a force that combined conventional and
guerrilla capabilities.
"Although the U.S. security situation is much different from that of
Israel, similarities do exist," the report said. "Both nations believe they
must prepare for challenges across the range of military operations.
Therefore, the following insights from recent Israeli experience have
relevance for the U.S."
A key finding was that Israel's air combat doctrine has been ineffective
against either Hamas or Hizbullah. The report asserted that air strikes must
be combined with a significant infantry and armor component to minimize the
insurgency use of civilian shields.
"The basics of combined arms fire and maneuver are necessary for
successful operations against sophisticated hybrid opponents who, like
Hizbullah and Hamas, have a modicum of training, organization, and advanced
weapons, particularly if they are operating 'among the people,'" the report,
authored by David Johnson, said. "Additionally, precision, standoff fires
are critical, but not sufficient, to cope with sophisticated hybrid
opponents. Furthermore, responsive and adequate air, artillery, and unmanned
aerial system support are critical components of the combined arms fight
against hybrid opponents."
Rand concluded that the Israel Army had underestimated Hizbullah's
capabilities to combine military maneuvers with sustained rocket fire. The
report cited Israel's long counter-insurgency campaign in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip and the military's assessment that conventional warfare would not
return to the Middle East.
"The U.S. presence in Iraq following OIF [U.S. invasion of Iraq in
2003], coupled with low threats from neighbors except Syria, encouraged a
belief that Israel was beyond the era of a major war and that the primary
role of ground forces was LIC [low-intensity conflict]," the report said.
"Some of the political and military elites in Israel have reached the
conclusion that Israel is beyond the era of wars. It had enough military
might and superiority to deter others from declaring war against her; these
would also be sufficient to send a painful reminder to anyone who seemed to
be undeterred; since Israel did not intend to initiate a war, the conclusion
was that the main challenge facing the land forces would be low intensity
asymmetrical conflicts."
The result was that Israel's military budget had been slashed, main
battle tanks and mechanized infantry became idle and training declined, the
report said. The best army commanders were used for CI operations, and air
force tactical air control capabilities were removed from infantry brigades.
"In Lebanon, the Israelis faced terrain and enemy conditions for which
they were not prepared," the report said. "Hizbullah, although not 10 feet
tall, was trained and organized into small units and armed with
sophisticated weapons, including anti-tank guided missiles, RPGs --
including RPG-29s -- rockets, mortars, mines, IEDs, and MANPADS."
Rand said the Hizbullah and Hamas threat required what the report termed
integrated joint air and ground intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance capabilities "similar to those used against conventional
adversaries, but at a reduced scale." The report said the army's command and
control system must also be revised to battle Hizbullah.
Israel's military was said to have renewed its heavy armored force to
confront Hamas and Hizbullah. Rand cited the resumption of production of the
Merkava Mk-4 main battle tank and the launch of the Namer infantry fighting
vehicle, based on the Mk-1. These assets were used in the Hamas war in
December 2008 and January 2009.
"The single most important change in the IDF between the 2006 Second
Lebanon War and the recent operation in Gaza was the clear understanding by
senior Israeli political and military
leaders that ground operations are an essential component of military
operations," the report said. "They no longer believe standoff attack alone,
principally by air, can create success. Thus, from the beginning, it was a
given to Israeli political and military leaders that ground forces would
have to fight in Gaza -- putting troops on the ground was a necessary
precondition to achieving their military and political objectives."
Rand warned that Israel's war with Hamas did not prove that the
military was certain to defeat Hizbullah. The report said Hamas was not as
capable as Hizbullah, and the Gaza Strip was flat while southern Lebanon was
hilly.
"Hizbullah defended its positions," the report said. "Hamas frequently
retreated. Hizbullah had advanced ATGMs and used them to good effect; Hamas
seems not to have had many and used few, if any, relying mainly on small
arms, RPGs, mortars, rockets, IEDs, and mines. Finally, Operation Cast Lead
[Israeli war against Hamas] was a relatively small-scale operation for the
Israeli Army, involving only a handful of brigades, one division, and the
Southern Command."
See more on this at Israel Behind the News
Showing posts with label Rand. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Rand. Show all posts
Sunday, May 2, 2010
Sunday, September 13, 2009
The Philadelphia Bulletin: Baghdad Cannot Destroy Al-Aqeda
by David Bedein
Jerusalem - A report submitted the week for the U.S. Defense Department has determined that Al Qaida in Iraq would resist any offensive by Baghdad over the next few years.
The report by the Rand Corp. asserted that Iraq, even with U.S. help, would fail to eliminate the Al Qaida (AQI) terror network.
"Eradicating AQI may exceed ISF capabilities, even with U.S. help, but the AQI threat is more likely to grow weaker rather than stronger," the report said.
Titled, "Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies," the report provided a bleak picture of Iraq's capability to destroy the Al Qaida terror network. Rand said Al Qaida would remain viable in Iraq despite a decline in financing and recruitment.
"AQI is hampered by a lack of popular support, by restricted movement, and by a dearth of financing," the report said. "It is now largely confined to Mosul, the Tigris River Valley, and Diyala province. One of its principal causes, and a source of recruiting and fund-raising -- the U.S. occupation -- is ending."
The report was released in late July 2009 amid a resurgence of Al Qaida in Iraq's largest province, Anbar. Al Qaida, after a lull of nearly two years, was said to have renewed operations in such Sunni cities as Faluja and Samara.
Rand said AQI has been hampered by the sharp drop in the flow of foreign volunteers to Iraq. As a result, the report said Al Qaida has been increasingly relying on Iraqi women for suicide and other operations.
Syria has been deemed as the way station for at least 90 percent of Al Qaida volunteers to Iraq. The report said Syria has hosted a range of Sunni insurgency groups exiled from Iraq and seeking to destabilize the Baghdad government.
A U.S. combat troop withdrawal was expected to renew the ethnic war in Iraq, another report said.
The Institute of National Security Studies asserted that the 130,000 American troops have largely succeeded in preventing civil war in Iraq. In a report by U.S. Air Force Maj. Clint ZumBrunnen, the institute warned that any reconciliation effort by Sunnis, Shi'ites and Kurds must be backed by American force.
"The correlation between fragile stability in Iraq and the presence of U.S. combat forces is difficult to ignore, even if it is true that US forces do not control the country," said the report by Zum Brunnen, a U.S. Air Force scholar.
The report dismissed U.S. claims of a military victory in the insurgency war in Iraq. Instead, ZumBrunnen asserted that the Sunni insurgency in Iraq abated when the United States provided massive financing to Sunni tribes in central and western Iraq.
"Any precipitous withdrawal of US combat power will greatly reduce U.S. leverage in Iraq and risk a return to the sectarian strife of 2006 simply because few of Iraq's serious internal conflicts have been resolved," the report said.
President Obama has pledged to withdraw all combat troops from Iraq by August 2010, leaving an estimated 50,000 advisers and support personnel.
But the report warned that Sunnis and Kurds, the biggest supporters of a U.S. military presence, would harden their positions toward the dominate Shi'ite community once the Americans begin to withdraw. For its part, the Shi'ite community has been split by a power struggle led by the Iranian-backed Mahdi Army, commanded by Moqtada Sadr.
Meanwhile, ZumBrunnen said, the United States has been led into a potential war in northern Iraq regarding the authority and size of the autonomous Kurdish region. The focus of the confrontation has been the oil-rich area of Kirkuk.
"Both sides are now edgier because there is less certainty that the U.S. will intervene to prevent one side or the other from exploiting an advantage," the report said. "And since any grand bargain between Arabs and Kurds mediated by the United Nations will likely require a powerful military force for enforcement, knowledge that U.S. forces will withdraw completely by 2011 lessens the chance for a nonviolent solution to the dispute.
Accordingly, both the [Kurdish] peshmerga and the ISF [Iraqi security forces] continue to prepare for eventual conflict."
The report said the United States must now focus on helping determine control over Iraq's crude oil reserves, deemed the most explosive of ethnic disputes. Since October 2008, no progress has been reported in talks between the government and major ethnic groups.
"This is where the additional role U.S. combat forces fill in Iraq comes into play," the report said. "Not only are these forces the guardians of a tense peace; they are also the instrument of power that lends credibility to other U.S. levers at the negotiating table.
Degrading their capability before any long term agreement exists on an issue so vital to Iraq's future weakens U.S. ability to shepherd all sides into a compromise, and more ominously, invites a return to the sectarianism of 2006 and 2007."
View the original article in the Philadelphia Bulletin
Jerusalem - A report submitted the week for the U.S. Defense Department has determined that Al Qaida in Iraq would resist any offensive by Baghdad over the next few years.
The report by the Rand Corp. asserted that Iraq, even with U.S. help, would fail to eliminate the Al Qaida (AQI) terror network.
"Eradicating AQI may exceed ISF capabilities, even with U.S. help, but the AQI threat is more likely to grow weaker rather than stronger," the report said.
Titled, "Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies," the report provided a bleak picture of Iraq's capability to destroy the Al Qaida terror network. Rand said Al Qaida would remain viable in Iraq despite a decline in financing and recruitment.
"AQI is hampered by a lack of popular support, by restricted movement, and by a dearth of financing," the report said. "It is now largely confined to Mosul, the Tigris River Valley, and Diyala province. One of its principal causes, and a source of recruiting and fund-raising -- the U.S. occupation -- is ending."
The report was released in late July 2009 amid a resurgence of Al Qaida in Iraq's largest province, Anbar. Al Qaida, after a lull of nearly two years, was said to have renewed operations in such Sunni cities as Faluja and Samara.
Rand said AQI has been hampered by the sharp drop in the flow of foreign volunteers to Iraq. As a result, the report said Al Qaida has been increasingly relying on Iraqi women for suicide and other operations.
Syria has been deemed as the way station for at least 90 percent of Al Qaida volunteers to Iraq. The report said Syria has hosted a range of Sunni insurgency groups exiled from Iraq and seeking to destabilize the Baghdad government.
A U.S. combat troop withdrawal was expected to renew the ethnic war in Iraq, another report said.
The Institute of National Security Studies asserted that the 130,000 American troops have largely succeeded in preventing civil war in Iraq. In a report by U.S. Air Force Maj. Clint ZumBrunnen, the institute warned that any reconciliation effort by Sunnis, Shi'ites and Kurds must be backed by American force.
"The correlation between fragile stability in Iraq and the presence of U.S. combat forces is difficult to ignore, even if it is true that US forces do not control the country," said the report by Zum Brunnen, a U.S. Air Force scholar.
The report dismissed U.S. claims of a military victory in the insurgency war in Iraq. Instead, ZumBrunnen asserted that the Sunni insurgency in Iraq abated when the United States provided massive financing to Sunni tribes in central and western Iraq.
"Any precipitous withdrawal of US combat power will greatly reduce U.S. leverage in Iraq and risk a return to the sectarian strife of 2006 simply because few of Iraq's serious internal conflicts have been resolved," the report said.
President Obama has pledged to withdraw all combat troops from Iraq by August 2010, leaving an estimated 50,000 advisers and support personnel.
But the report warned that Sunnis and Kurds, the biggest supporters of a U.S. military presence, would harden their positions toward the dominate Shi'ite community once the Americans begin to withdraw. For its part, the Shi'ite community has been split by a power struggle led by the Iranian-backed Mahdi Army, commanded by Moqtada Sadr.
Meanwhile, ZumBrunnen said, the United States has been led into a potential war in northern Iraq regarding the authority and size of the autonomous Kurdish region. The focus of the confrontation has been the oil-rich area of Kirkuk.
"Both sides are now edgier because there is less certainty that the U.S. will intervene to prevent one side or the other from exploiting an advantage," the report said. "And since any grand bargain between Arabs and Kurds mediated by the United Nations will likely require a powerful military force for enforcement, knowledge that U.S. forces will withdraw completely by 2011 lessens the chance for a nonviolent solution to the dispute.
Accordingly, both the [Kurdish] peshmerga and the ISF [Iraqi security forces] continue to prepare for eventual conflict."
The report said the United States must now focus on helping determine control over Iraq's crude oil reserves, deemed the most explosive of ethnic disputes. Since October 2008, no progress has been reported in talks between the government and major ethnic groups.
"This is where the additional role U.S. combat forces fill in Iraq comes into play," the report said. "Not only are these forces the guardians of a tense peace; they are also the instrument of power that lends credibility to other U.S. levers at the negotiating table.
Degrading their capability before any long term agreement exists on an issue so vital to Iraq's future weakens U.S. ability to shepherd all sides into a compromise, and more ominously, invites a return to the sectarianism of 2006 and 2007."
View the original article in the Philadelphia Bulletin
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